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Abstract
This thesis proposes a quantitative method to optimize inspection/repair intervention in
rail defect management. Rail defect management is important for track maintenance,
since rails are the most significant and basic component of the track systems. Rail
inspection is a fundamental intervention to prevent rail failure. Railroads have evolved
the rail inspection interval based on their empirical judgement and on field data.
A crack size is predicted by linear elastic fracture mechanics (LEFM). The proposed
method identifies the time-varying rail reliability due to deterioration, using data obtained
from LEFM and from first-order reliability methods (FORM), which consider the
uncertainty regarding the model. Since FORM is an approximation method, Monte Carlo
simulation confirms the results.
To represent practical situations regarding rail defect management, an event tree (ET)
analysis is performed. The ET is modeled to all events and actions with respect to
inspection/repair intervention. The ET analysis evaluates the expected reliability of a rail
after inspections and possible remedial actions. Based on these results, a life-cycle cost
(LCC) model is formulated, taking into consideration the time value of money.
To this end, applications of the model to optimization of inspection intervals and to
investigation of the effect of nondestructive testing and remedial actions on the LCC and
the interval are analyzed. As a result, it is possible to extend the present inspection
interval. Additionally, the effect of detectability of nondestructive testing on the LCC is
more significant than that of accuracy of nondestructive testing, and a proactive
maintenance policy may reduce both the expected total cost and the number of
inspections.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Overview
Railroad operation requires many employees due to the diverse and unique
characteristics of railroad systems in comparison with other transportation industries. For
instance, airline companies do not need to manage airports to operate their business even
though they have many airplanes. Likewise, a bus business does not require managing
and maintaining a highway to use it, though they have to pay for it. On the other hand,
railroad firms generally have all the facilities such as tracks, rolling stock, stations, and
electric lines, and have to work from planning, constructing, operating, and maintaining
with respect to the railroad business.
Since track maintenance is among the most labor-intensive of company activities,
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the reduction of maintenance is required for sound management of railroad companies.
As a matter of fact, statistics show that rail maintenance cost is up to thirty percent of the
total operation cost in East Japan Railway Company (JR East) as shown in Fig. 1.1.
Given this huge investment, along with an increasing scarcity of resources as shown in
Fig. 1.2, it is essential that the funds be used as efficiently as possible.
This thesis describes in depth optimization of rail inspection, which is a part of
track maintenance management, based on the structural reliability theory taking into
account the uncertainty of inspection equipment and of remedial actions. It proposes a
method to determine the optimal number of rail inspections during the service life by
minimizing the Life-Cycle Cost (LCC).
1.2 Motivation and Problem Statement
Rails deteriorate over time and need maintenance to detect and correct damage,
deterioration, and cracks. Because rails are the most significant and basic component of
railroad systems and the damaged rails may result in accidents, it is very important that
rails should be maintained and inspected routinely. In other words, the reliability of rails
depends upon the frequency and quality of the maintenance programs. In spite of the fact
that railroad companies have attempted to reduce the number of broken rails by making
use of various management techniques, the numbers have not yet reached zero. Fig. 1.3
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shows the number of broken rails during the fiscal year from 1999 to 2001 in JR East,
and Fig. 1.4 depicts the location of the defects in the broken rails. The railroad industry
still has a hurdle to overcome this issues regarding track maintenance. Further,
optimization of rail maintenance has the potential for significant industry-wide benefits.
In order to prevent rails from breaking during the service life, railroad companies
have two policy options in rail defect management: one is to improve the material,
making it more durable; the other is to increase the frequency of rail inspection. Yet it is a
difficult task to develop a new material that will not develop cracks during its service life.
As for the frequency of rail inspection, it is also expensive for the company to
significantly increase the frequency of rail inspection. Neither option is a practical
solution to the problem of rail failure.
An efficient rail maintenance program requires careful planning based on
potential modes of the rail failure, the history of repairs done, and the frequency and
intensity of applied trainload. Effective maintenance/repair intervention can enhance the
reliability of railroad systems, and, at the same time, maintain a reliability level that
reduces the possibility of costly failures in the future. Optimization of rail inspections
based on a probabilistic model can reduce rail maintenance work and its cost. Working
out a better strategy for rail inspection will allow railroad companies to save maintenance
costs without increased risk to passengers.
The Japanese government requires railroad companies to make company
regulations for maintaining tracks. Each railroad company is able to institute specific
inspection and repair regulations in detail, such as the frequency of inspection, the
19
method of inspection, and the criterion of judgment, as long as the rules are consistent
with the government codes. Regarding remedial actions accompanied with rail
inspections, JR East establishes the rules shown in Tablel.1. Table 1.2 shows the rules
ratified by the Department of Transportation (DOT) for reference. JR East institutes the
rail inspection rules for each unit rail, basically 25 [m]. JR East has a database that has
the age and accumulation of the trainload for the maintenance management. JR East can
identify the location of the rails and the results of rail inspections by using the database.
JR East set up rules by which the track engineers have to replace the rails at 400
Million Gross Tons (MGT) with new one. This value is derived from Miner's damage
accumulation law and empirical judgement. In general, either Miner's law or particular
probability distributions such as Weibull and Exponential distribution that are a part of
extreme distributions are used to evaluate fatigue life and reliability in steel materials
such as rails. However, this probabilistic model has some drawbacks that make it
unfriendly to use in the reliability analysis other than estimation of its life expectancy.
One reason is that it is difficult to determine its shape parameter to represent rail
characteristics, even though Bayes' Theorem is used as the epistemic model. The other is
that it is difficult for the Weibull model to reflect the inspection results, since the Weibull
model does not include information about the crack size. In contrast, the railroad
companies obtain the results of inspection from crack size information.
Therefore, it is essential for railroad companies to establish a quantitative method
for optimization of rail inspection/repair intervention, taking into consideration on
capability and quality of inspection and repair policy.
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Fig. 1.1 Operating Cost in Railroad Business of JR East
Inazu, H. (2003), "Innovation of Maintenance," JR East Technical Review, No2, pp. 4-5.
http://www.jreast.co.jp/development/englishlpaper/contentsO2.html
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Fig. 1.2 Operating Income in JR East
JR East (2002), "Annual Report," pp. 44-45. (ldollar=100 yen)
http://www.jreast.co.jp/e/investor/finance/ar2002.html
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Fig. 1.3 The Number of Broken Rails in JR East
Ohsawa, S. (2003), "JR Higashi-Nihon ni okeru re-ru sessonn taisaku," Nippon Tetsudou
Shisetsu Kyokai, Nippon Tetsudou Shisetsu Kyokai-Shi, April, pp. 265-268.
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Fig. 1.4 The Location of Defects in Broken Rails in JR East
Ohsawa, S. (2003),"JR Higashi-Nihon ni okeru re-ru sessonn taisaku," Nippon Tetsudou
Shisetsu Kyokai, Nippon Tetsudou Shisetsu Kyokai-Shi, pp. 265-268.
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Tablel.1 Remedial Action Table in JR East
Type of Defects Criteria [mm] Remedial action
5 a <15 Marking for check
Vertical split head 15 a < 30 Apply bolted joint bar and planto replace
30 a Replace immediately
2 5 a < 6 Marking for check
Split web 6 a <10 Apply bolted joint bar and plan
to replace
10 a Replace immediately
a < 3 Apply bolted joint bar and planBroken Base to replace
3 a Replace immediately
Bolt-hole crack a < 5 Marking for check5 a Replace immediately
JR East (2003), "Shisetsu-Kensetsu Hohki Ruisyu," pp. 327-328.
Tablel.2 Remedial Action Table in DOT
Type of Defects Criteria [mm] Remedial action if the rail is
not replaced
Limit operating speed over
defective rail to 48 [km/h]
Vertical split head 2.54 a <5.08 Inspect the rail 30 days after it is
determined to continue the track
in use
Limit operating speed as
Split web 10.16 a authorized by track supervisorOperating speed cannot be over
48[km/h]
Apply joint bars bolted within
10days after it is determined to
Broken Base 2.54 < a < 15.24 continue the track in useAfter applying the joint bars,
limit operating speed to
80[km/h]
Limit operating speed over
defective rail to 80 [km/h]
Bolt-hole crack 2.54 a < 3.81 Inspect the rail 30 days after it is
determined to continue the track
in use
Department of Transportation (1998), "Track Standards Part 213," pp. 33-41.
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1.3 Objective
The main objective of this study is to develop a method for optimization of rail
inspection/repair based on the structural reliability theory. The following are the sub-
objectives to carry out the main purpose:
" Assessing crack growth during the service life while estimating the stress
amplitude by variable trainloads.
* Evaluating the time-varying rail reliability profile, considering both rail
inspections by Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) and remedial actions.
* Optimizing the number of rail inspections so as to minimize the expected
total costs.
" Contemplating the specifications for the effect of changing NDT techniques
and of remedial actions on the LCC and the optimal inspection interval.
1.4 Study Approach
Fig. 1.5 illustrates the structure of the study approach. Following literature
reviews, a five-step analysis is used for optimization of rail inspections.
First of all, a literature review is performed to document the validation of the
reliability-based approach for optimization of rail inspections. This review also identifies
the way to formulate the reliability index of rails without using complex numerical
24
calculus, a formidable task. In addition to the review, another literature review regarding
railroad maintenance is also carried out.
In a step-one analysis, Linear Elastic Fracture Mechanics (LEFM) based on Paris
and Erdogan's kinetic crack growth law predicts the rail fatigue life using the results of
stress amplitude estimates. The semi-elliptical crack model in LEFM shows the crack size
of the rail base at arbitrary times. A continuously supported elastic model for railroad
tracks is applied to determine the rail stress by a solving fourth-order differential equation
based on engineering mechanics of rails. A superposition method calculates the total
stress amplitude by combining each stress caused by a rolling stock axial load. For
information about rail design parameters, general rails in conventional railroad systems in
Japan are employed.
As a step-two analysis, First-Order Reliability Methods (FORM) create the
reliability profile of rails as a reliability index: beta. The initial crack size, critical crack
size, and material parameters are random variables in the analysis. It is noted that the
variable stress amplitude converts to the effective stress range to characterize a stress
spectrum. Moreover, the accuracy of the second-moment linear approximation is
generally difficult to assess, because it will depend on the degree of non-linearity of the
performance function in FORM. Therefore, a large sample Monte Carlo Simulation
(MCS) verifies the reliability index calculated by FORM.
Third, an Event Tree (ET) analysis resolves all possible consequences of detecting
defects and remedial actions with probability. Moreover, as a result of the ET analysis,
the expected reliability index with time horizontal is calculated. Qualification and
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accuracy of NDT are taken care of by use of a Probabilistic Density Function (PDF), and
the PDF represents the uncertainty of remedial actions.
The fourth analysis of LCC optimizes the number of inspections so as to
minimize the expected total cost, including the inspection cost, repair cost, and failure
cost, considering the time value of money. When the frequency of inspections is high, the
reliability is improved. However, the cost is also high. When the frequency of rail
inspections is low, it is difficult to maintain operability. The most practical solution is to
find an optimal number of inspections.
Finally, sensitivity analysis shows the effect of capability and precision of
inspection device, repair regulation, and failure cost for the reliability of rail on the LCC
and the frequency of inspections.
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Continuously Supported
Elastic Track Model
I El.
Evaluation of Stress
Amplitude
Step 1: LEFM Analysis
Step 2: FORM Analysis
Super Position Method
I
Verification of
FORM by MCS
Uncertainty
of NDT
Uncertainty of
Remedial Actions
Step 4: LCC Analysis
Fig. 1.5 Structure of Study Approach
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Step 3: ET Analysis
1.5 Thesis Format
Fig. 1.6 shows the organization of this thesis. Following this introduction, the
thesis consists of four remaining chapters.
Chapter 2 reviews the current literature on reliability-based optimization of
inspection in both bridge structures and offshore structures. The efforts of the researchers
to apply the structural reliability theory to making a decision about maintenance strategy
are reviewed. In particular, the review is focused on different approaches to decide the
optimal timing of inspection/repair and the characteristics of each structure. Moreover,
this chapter presents literature review regarding railroad maintenance for rail car trucks as
well as rail fatigue analysis.
Chapter 3 lays out the research methodology for this thesis. It demonstrates how
crack size grows and how FORM accommodates uncertainty and calculates a reliability
index by using random variable data. The method generates a time-varying reliability
index of rails.
Chapter 4 gives the optimal number of inspections and demonstrates sensitivity
analysis as a part of applications of a method developed during this study. Through the
sensitivity analysis, the effect of quality of inspection is analyzed, when the company
exchanges conventional devices for high performance inspection instruments. In addition,
the sensitivity analysis analyzes the effect of changing the probability of repair, meaning
that the company modifies the remedial action codes. Since failure cost can definitely
affect the optimization in this type of approach, sensitivity analysis also clarifies the
influence on the expected total cost.
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Chapter 5 presents the conclusions of the research and proposes further research
recommendations.
Chapter 2: Review
* Optimization of inspection/repair for civil structures
* Railroad maintenance
Chapter 3: Methodology
" LEFM analysis to predict crack size
* FORM analysis to evaluate the rail reliability
* ET analysis to perform inspection/remedial actions
* LCC analysis to assess the economical issues
Chapter 4: Application
* Optimization of the number of inspections
* Sensitivity analysis for inspection devices and remedial actions
I
Chapter 5: Conclusion
* Conclusions
0 Recommendations
Fig. 1.6 Organization of Thesis
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
This chapter presents a literature review for optimization of inspectionlrepair
intervention in civil structures, such as bridges and offshore structures. The first paper
describes the framework of optimization for a reinforced concrete bridge, considering
deterioration due to bar corrosion. The second paper refers to offshore structures using
another method to decide the timing and areas of inspections appropriate for those
structures.
In addition to the literature regarding optimization of inspection/repair in civil
structures, two papers on railroad maintenance are discussed. The first of them describes
Condition-Based Maintenance (CBM) for rolling stock. CBM is the maintenance strategy
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by which maintenance is undertaken only when a component in the system reaches a
particular state of deterioration. The final paper refers to rail fatigue analysis and
combines laboratory data with field data to improve the conventional Miner's law
approach.
2.2 Bridge Structures
The work of Frangopol et al. (1997) provides a conceptual framework for
reliability-based LCC design of deteriorating concrete structures. In this approach,
reinforced concrete T-girders subject to corrosion are used. The results demonstrate the
feasibility of optimizing the inspection/repair strategy for bridges. Some researchers such
as Mori and Ellingwood (1984) and Thoft-Christensen and Sorensen (1987) propose the
same methodology of evaluating the reliability of structures and optimizing the
inspection/repair strategy. However, their works do not cover all, for example, several
aspects such as effects of inspection methods, degrading rate over time, and costs of
failure. These aspects are important to make the inspection/repair strategy robust and
reliable. Frangopol et al. expand the way to optimize the inspection/repair strategy Mori
and Ellingwood postulate into the real bridges.
First of all, Frangopol et al. point out that much repair maintenance in highway
bridges is based on experience and local practice rather than on sound theoretical
investigations, while guidance for routine maintenance exists. A maintenance strategy
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supported by only engineering experience is not necessarily better. Therefore, they insist
that the reliability should be evaluated by the probabilistic method. They employ a Limit
State Equation (LSE) of time-varying bending moment capacity in the second moment
analysis to calculate the failure probability using the MCS technique.
Next, as an effect of the inspection method, the capability of inspection is taken
into account. In general, the detectability depends on the type of inspection device and
the nature of defects in structures. Instinctively, a high cost device should be more
accurate and more capable when compared to an inexpensive one. Frangopol et al. define
damage intensity, which represents the degree of existing damage due to the corrosion of
a bending bar at arbitrary times in order to quantify a damage detectability function. The
damage detectability function, which is a function of damage intensity, is assumed
normally to be distributed around 50%-50% chance detection.
Third, Frangopol et al. indicate that a systematic means of structuring and
evaluating the repair possibility related to an uncertain inspection/repair environment
provided by an Event Tree (ET) analysis. In the study, the ET is used to represent all
possible events associated with only repair and no-repair. It is assumed that bridge agents
always repair or rehabilitate bridges if defects are detected.
Fourth, a total expected cost including inspection cost, repair cost, and failure cost
is evaluated as LCC based on the results of the ET analysis. The LCC is mathematically
combined by the probabilistic expected value of each cost. A trade-off appears between a
higher reliability and the minimum expected total cost. The goal of an optimal
inspection/repair strategy is to minimize the LCC of a given structure while satisfying
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acceptable reliability level throughout the service life.
Finally, numerical results indicate that the optimal number of inspections is six in
a particular reinforced concrete bridge; When the service life is 75 years, failure
probability 0.02275 is an acceptable reliability level, inspection cost is 5.4units, repair
cost is 115.4units, and failure cost is 50000units. In addition, the influence of changing
failure cost and inspection quality is analyzed through the sensitivity analysis.
2.3 Offshore Structures
Onoufriou (1999) presents a study on the development and an application of
reliability-based inspection planning technique for offshore structures, such as fixed
platforms and jack-up drilling rigs. The general methodology on the structural reliability
theory is used to optimize inspection schedule, while reflecting the characteristics of
offshore structures. Offshore structures have a lot of welded joints and some joints are
underwater where critical live loads are waves and wind. Underwater inspections are
used as a means of monitoring the integrity and performance of these offshore structures
to ensure their safety and operability. However, these adverse circumstances represent a
significant cost to the operators. In a more conventional approach to inspection planning
in offshore structures, the various inspection criteria are combined in a qualitative manner
to make an inspection plan. Therefore, the industry needs a tool for rationalizing
quantitatively the selection of joints for inspections in order to maximize the efficiency of
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inspections. Onoufriou set out the following methodology.
The first step is to identify the significant joints to reduce the area of inspections
in the way the criterion has fatigue life of less than ten times the service life of the
structure. The next step is to perform a probabilistic fatigue analysis to calculate the
failure probability of the joints during the service life, using both the linear cumulative
damage law and fracture mechanics regarding LSE. The reason two ways is used is that
the former is for fatigue life prediction and the latter method is for updating the crack
information.
Furthermore, when these reliability levels reach particular values over time, called
target level, it is assumed that inspection has to be done. In the case of "no detection,"
where no crack is detected at that time, it is possible to update the reliability curve to
reflect the increased estimation confidence in the performance of the joints by the
Bayesian approach. The likelihood function in Bayes' theorem behaves as a kind of filter
representing the quality of inspection technique. When performing inspection updating
for "crack detected," where a defect is found, the subsequent inspection interval reduces
as detected cracking size increases. It is to be expected that the information obtained from
the inspection shows that cracks have propagated faster than originally anticipated and
the information is reflected in crack growth prediction in the future.
The procedure is repeated until optimizing the number of inspections. Target
reliability level, where an inspection is supposed to be done, can typically be determined
by taking into account the magnitude of failure consequence. If the consequence is very
serious for the intact structure, the high target reliability level is adopted; otherwise, the
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lower level is employed. Offshore structures have many welded joints, alluded to before,
making their redundant against failure. Onoufriou also determines the target reliability
level derived from the redundancy analysis. The target values are important parameters in
this type of analysis, so that the determination of the value deserves careful consideration.
Onoufriou finally mentions that these methods are not intended to replace the
more traditional approach and engineering judgement as the conclusion. The methods are
regarded as an additional tool to make more rational decision to be made on inspection
planning with significant safety and cost benefit.
2.4 CBM Applied to Rolling Stock
Ma (1997) proposes a maintenance strategy based on the CBM technique to
decide the optimal replacement condition by minimizing the LCC and applies the method
to rolling stock maintenance. CBM is the maintenance strategy by which the maintenance
is undertaken only when a component in the systems reaches a particular state or
condition of deterioration. The key issue when implementing CBM is the accuracy of the
inspection, because CBM allows car shop engineers to decide the timing of replacement
of the components based on the condition that the inspection indicates.
Since, for many practical reasons, the car shop engineers usually perform only
external inspection for rolling stock, it is essential to estimate the internal condition from
the results of that external inspection. Ma follows the performance threshold method,
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which consist of an evaluation of system and random parts, to predict the internal
condition from the external condition. Even though the statistical forecast technique is
applied, the results inevitably have errors. Ma compensates the errors with sensitivity
and specificity method, usually used in epidemiological study. Finally the research
addresses a LCC model, which evaluates all economic issues including initial cost,
installation cost, salvage cost, and failure cost. As a result, Ma proposes rolling stock
should be inspected at 0.4-condition limit state, which is the nominal value, under both
perfect and imperfect inspection techniques.
2.5 Rail Fatigue Analysis
The research of Shyr (1993) enhances the Phoenix model developed by the
Association of American Railroads (AAR), a conventional rail fatigue analysis model
based on Miner's damage accumulation law, by combining field data with laboratory
data. Since the Phoenix model had been developed on the basis of theories of material
behavior and laboratory results only, it has been used primarily as a supplemental tool to
analyze rail fatigue. Shyr develops his improved model using the Bayesian updating
method to combine both data sources, considering all types of rail defects in the railhead
including transverse defects and split head defects.
Shyr formulates a hazard rate function to predict rail fatigue life, using previous
results and assuming that rail fatigue follows the Weibull distribution. Current railroads
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are sometimes welded, so that rail fatigue needs to be set up for welded rail in addition to
traditional joint rails. The formulation uses the Poisson approach for spatial aggregation
of rail units in the welded track.
Finally, Shyr draws comparison parameters between the Phoenix model and his
model by using the t-statistics method. It turns out that the Phoenix model underestimates
the scale of transverse defects and overestimates the scale of split head defects to predict
fatigue defects. Hence, the Phoenix model does not always accurately represent actual
situations.
2.6 Summary
Based on the literature review, it is found that the structural reliability theory can
predict the reliability level when considering the uncertainty of inspection devices and
remedial actions. In addition, the ET and LCC analysis can optimize the number of
inspections during the service life. When applying the structural reliability theory to other
structures, it is important to tale into account the unique characteristics of those
structures, such as load condition, inspection devices, and decision-making process.
Furthermore, through the literature review of railroad maintenance, it turns out that CBM
can not take into account the uncertainty of deterioration models, and the conventional
method for rail fatigue analysis can not reflect the results of in-service inspections, even
if enhanced by using several statistics approaches.
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Chapter 3
Reliability-Based Optimization of Rail
Inspection
3.1 Introduction
This chapter presents a methodology developed for the application of LEFM
analysis, FORM analysis, ET analysis, and LCC analysis in order to investigate
optimization of rail inspection/repair intervention. The outputs from the LEFM analysis
are used for the FORM analysis to evaluate the reliability profile of a rail at arbitrary
times, taking into account deterioration due to the rail base crack. The ET analysis
presents systematically all possible events and actions which track engineers can take.
The LCC analysis shows the total expected cost regarding rail defect management based
on the ET analysis.
39
3.2 LEFM Analysis
3.2.1 Crack Growth Model
In general, many fatigue life analyses have applied the Miner's damage
accumulation law or some specific PDFs such as the Weibull and Exponential
distributions, to predict the probabilistic life of a metallic material, since the models
accordingly represent the characteristics of the material. However, railroad companies
usually use a crack size as the inspection results. Therefore, it is hard to deal with
reflecting the results of the inspections and repair strategy in their approaches because
they do not provide information about crack size. A quantitative analysis for the rail
reliability needs the knowledge of the crack size at arbitrary times, so a crack growth
model based on LEFM is employed instead of the Miner's damage accumulation and a
specific PDF model in this thesis.
The crack growth model used in this study is based on the Paris and Erdogan's
law, where the rate of crack growth is defined as
da
d = C(AK) (3.1)dN
where, a is the crack size, N is the number of the stress cycles, C and m are
material parameters, and AK is the stress intensity factor range. According to LEFM
under a constant amplitude loading, AK can be estimated as
AK = K. - K. =YS (3.2)
where, Y is the geometric correction factor and S is the tensile stress range, also
called the far-field stress range.
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It is noted that the use of the stress intensity factors implies that equation (3.1)
only applies to essentially elastic situation, so that the factor provides a reasonable
description of the crack tip stress field for a distance up to 0. la from the crack tip.
3.2.2 Bending Moment and Stress at Rail Base
The application of LEFM to surface defects requires knowledge of the stress
intensity factor. The stress intensity factor is generally a function of stress amplitude as
described in the previous section. Hence, it is essential to evaluate the stress amplitude in
the LEFM analysis.
The track consisting of rails, ties, ballasts, and a roadbed can be designed as the
continuously supported elastic model as depicted in Fig. 3.1. The equation to express rail
displacement applied by trainloads can be set up by a forth-order differential equation
described as
d 4 yEI 4 + ky = 0 (3.3)
dx
where, E is the Young's modulus of the rail, I is the second moment of area of the
rail, x and y are the axes in the two dimensional coordinates, and k is the spring
coefficient at the rail support, which indicates elasticity of both ties and ballasts (Sato
1997). The second-order integral of the equation (3.3) indicates the bending moment of a
rail base under the following boundary condition:
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dy
x= 0: -> =0 (3.4)
dx
x = 0 -> 2EI d Y W (3.5)
dx3
x -+ 0 --> y -> 0 (3.6)
hence, the bending moment can be expressed as
Mi= EId2 y W ep k 0.2 Cos k )0.25xsin. k )0.2s
Mx2 k "05 4EI 4EI 4EId 4 - -e~(k 02 cs~kY E)
4EI
(3.7)
here, W is the trainload. k, the spring coefficient at the rail support, can be defined as
1 1k = -- 1(3.8)
1 + d
KI K 2
where, K is the comprehensive spring coefficient of a tie both considering the tie
bending and compression, K2 is the spring coefficient of ballasts, and d is the tie
interval. K, can be expressed as
K1 (3.9)1 1
Ka Kb
here, Ka is the spring coefficient of the rail pad and Kb is the spring coefficient of the
tie bending obtained by solving another differential equation. Ka is equal to 49 [kN/m],
Kb is equal to 202.6 [kN/m] and K 2 is equal to 22.2 [kN/m] based on the rail track
engineering. Consequently, k is 22.15 [MPa].
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Fig. 3.1 Continuously Supported Elastic ModelRadd
The bending moment at a particular point in a rail base caused by trains is
calculated based on the superposition method because of the linearity. Therefore, the total
bending moment can be expressed as
M =LMi (3.10)
i=1
where, M is the total bending moment, M is the moment caused by each wheel load,
and 1 is the number of wheel. Since recent rolling stock has bogie trucks, Fig. 3.2 can
model trainloads, where each wheel load is 10 [t]. The fixed distance between axes is
around from 1.9 [m] -2.3 [m] (Yazawa 2000); here 2.0 [m] are employed. Next bogie
truck is more than 10 [m] apart, so that the influence of the trainload for the area of
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interest can be neglected. The total bending moment is divided by the modulus of section
to evaluate the stress. Fig. 3.3 shows the result when train speed is 100 [km/h]. As shown
in the graph, in addition to the expected tensile stress that occurs when the trainload
passes directly over the simulated point of measurement, there is also compression stress.
The compression stress occurs just before and just after the trainload passes. The
compression stress is one third of the tensile stress. Consequently, the stress amplitude is
50 [MPa] at the maximum. The modulus of section of general rail, 50N used in JR East is
2.739E-4 [M3], and the rail flexural rigidity is 4.12E-9 [tm2]
The above result derives from not dynamics but statics. Actual mechanics by the
trainload is dynamic and it is known that the dynamic stress is greater than the static one
due to the concavity and convexity of rail/wheel as well as rail irregularities. Therefore,
in order to describe the phenomenon in this thesis, it is assumed that the stress due to the
trainload consists of two components, which are the static stress and dynamic stress and
the stress can be broken down as
-=Us + UD (3.11)
where, a is the stress, as is the static stress, and aD is the dynamic stress.
This model has advantage of treatability. If both the static and dynamic stress
follow the stationary Gaussian random process, the stress amplitude follows Rayleigh
distribution. The stress intensity factor range can be the distinction between the maximum
and the minimum value of the stress intensity factor under a constant amplitude stress. As
a matter of course, the stress intensity factor associated with a variable amplitude stress is
different from that calculated under a constant amplitude stress, discussed in detail later.
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Fig. 3.3 Rail Base Stress Caused by Trainload
3.2.3 Semi-Elliptical Crack Model
Fatigue failure is initiated by an imperfection of materials or from tiny cracks
inside the materials. Cracks grow due to cyclic loads applied to the material. As for rail
fatigue, rail defects in JR East are generally classified as: 1) traverse defects in the rail
head; 2) longitudinal defects in the rail head; 3) surface defects in the rail head; 4) surface
defects in the rail head; 5) web defects; 6) base defects; 7) joint-hole defects. This study
focuses on the fatigue related to defects in the base area since base defects have been
recently responsible for more than 50% of the reasons for the rail broken in JR East as
shown in Fig. 1.4 and also for simplifying the analysis.
It is believed that base traverse defects in rails start from a surface imperfection,
which is a fabrication crack in the steel. Impacts of wheel and bending stress initiate
growth of base separation around the tiny imperfection. Natural crack occurring in
practice are often initiated at corners and edges. They tend to grow inwards and assume
to be semi-elliptical shape. Therefore, the semi-elliptical crack model is employed to
represent base defects of rails with the aspect ratio, a/c =1.0 in this thesis as shown Fig.
3.4. The stress intensity factor in the semi-elliptical crack model can be defined as
K = 1.12u-(a) 0.5  (3.12)
here, or is the far-field stress, a is the crack size, and is an elliptical integral of the
second kind, given by
x 1 c2 2 2
f= 1- 2 a sin 2 (0 dp (3.13)
0C
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where, a and c are defined in Fig. 3.4. If a/c
approximated by the following equation (Pook 2000).
f1+1.464 a .
C),
is less than one, the value is
(3.14)
a/c=1.0
a '
2c
Fig. 3.4 Semi-Elliptical Crack Model
3.2.4 Fatigue Damage Accumulation Function
Integrating equation (3.1) after substituting equation (3.2) for equation (3.1)
from a, to a 2 corresponding to the number of stress cycle Ni and N2, one obtains
a2 1N2
1 da = CSmdN
a, Y(a) N,
(3.15)
According to Madsen (1985), a function reflecting the damage accumulation from crack
size al to a 2 can be defined as
a2
'P(ala 2)= f 1 . da
Y (ga Y
(3.16)
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This damage accumulation function is related to the load accumulation by
'P(ai a 2 )= CSM(N 2 - NI) (3.17)
where, S' is the mean stress-range effect, which is an m -order moment of the PDF of
a stress amplitude parameter (Haldar 1994).
An actual rail is usually subjected to a variable amplitude load process as alluded
to before. Two possibilities are the cycle-cycle counting and the mean stress-range effect
method to consider the fatigue under a variable amplitude stress. The method to count
step-by-step each stress occurred in a rail is not practical. The mean stress-rang effect
method might be appropriate to the study for the fatigue damage accumulation in rails.
The mean stress-range effect can be evaluated as
s =f smfs (s) ds (3.18)
0
where, fs (s) is the PDF of the stress range parameter, S which is assumed to follow
the stationary Gaussian random process. For rails, the Rayleigh distribution would be the
most appropriate for estimation of S since the trainload stress can comprise of two
components: one is static and the other is dynamic stress as indicated in the section 3.1.2.
If the stress range parameter follows a Rayleigh distribution, the mean stress-range effect
can be shown as follows:
S' = (S.i)mF rM+1 (3.19)
w2
where, IF is a gamma function, and So is a statistical parameter expressed as
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so = S - (3.20)
where, S is the mean value of S , which is 50 [MPa] calculated in the section 3.2.2
3.3 FORM Analysis
3.3.1 Hasofer-Lind Reliability Index
Not only fatigue but also strength of materials is so sensitive that they are
statistical by nature. In addition, it is intricate to evaluate the meticulous probability of
the failure in materials applied to cyclic loads at arbitrary times. Even if estimated, the
results can be much widely varied. Therefore, instead of the rail safety evaluated by
rigorous probabilistic prediction of failure, a kind of index that is the Hasofer-Lind
reliability index: beta assesses the reliability of rails in this thesis.
This thesis mainly focuses on the issue of reliability using the probability theory.
Hence, the probabilistic reliability analysis is discussed in detail in this section. The
structural reliability theory is concerned with rational treatment of uncertainties in
structures and with the method for assessing the safety and serviceability in structures.
The uncertainties are usually described as a random variable vector X = (x 1 , x,-...,xn)
In the basic concept from the classical structural reliability theory proposed by
Cornell (1969), a random variable vector relevant to loads and resistance parameters in
structures and functional relationship among them are required. The relationship can be
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expressed as
Z = g(xJ1, x2---I Xn ) = g (X ) (3.21)
This function is called the LSF. The failure surface, which is in a limit state of the
structures, is called the Limit State Equation (LSE), and it can be defines as
g(X)= 0 (3.22)
Geometrically, the LSE is an n-dimensional surface. One side of the failure surface is the
safe state, g(X)> 0 whereas the other side of the failure surface is the failure
state, g(X)< 0 . Hence, if the joint PDF of the variables, x1I,x 2 ,...,Xn is
fx,,X2,..-,x. (xix 2 ... Xn ), the probability of failure: pf can be defined as
P = ---. f fxI,'x(xl,x 2 ,...,Xn) dxldx2 --- dxn (3.23)
X1,X2,--,Xn<0
this is rewritten for brevity by the volume integral of fx (x) over the failure region as
P = f f(x) dx (3.24)
g(x)<o
In general, solving the integrals from the above equation is a complicated
process and can be done in a closed form only for a simple case. Moreover, the
calculation of multi-dimensional integral requires the information of the joint PDF or
each PDF of the variables. For practical reasons, the information is often unavailable or
too difficult to obtain on sufficient data. Therefore, some alternative methods are needed
in order to evaluate the probability of failure. These methods can be either analytical or
numerical. Analytical methods to represent the reliability as a reliability index: beta. One
of them is the First-Order Second Moment (FOSM) method based on determining mean
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and variance of the variables. Numerical methods evaluate directly the reliability through
simulations, such as the Monte Carlo Simulation and the Latin Hyper Sampling.
The concept by Cornell has an invariance problem that the results change by the
way to define a LSF. Hence, Hasofer-Lind (1974) improves the concept to the FORM.
The reliability index: beta is defined as the minimum distance from the origin to a failure
surface of a space defined with the random vectors in this approach. The most probable
point (MPP) of failure, the design point, is found in a standard normal space U for a
single failure driven LSE. The components of U are normally distributed with zero
means and unit variance and are statistically independent. Any set of continuous random
vectors can be transformed into U using the equivalent normal variables (see Appendix
A). The MPP u* also lives on the hyper surface and the location is the closest point on
the LSE to the origin in U -space. The MPP can be found by figuring out the following
constrained optimization problem.
Minimize D= U U (3.25)
s.t. g(u)=0
where, D is the distance from the origin to the MPP, and T is transpose notation.
Although various algorithms exist to perform the MPP search, one of them is the
Rackwitz-Fieesler (1978) algorithm, which is based on Newton-Raphson root solving
recursive approach. The formula is defined as
U - 1 12[Vg(U-k)T .g(uk)-g(uk)]Vg(uik) (3.26)
| Vg(ulk |
here, u!,, is the MPP at the (k+1)th iteration, Vg(uk) is the gradient vector of LSE at
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u1 , kth iteration point (see Appendix B). When the LSE is nonlinear, the gradient is not
constant and varies from one point to another point. Hence, the MPP has to be searched
through the recursive formula given by equation (3.26). If the LSE is linear, FORM can
give a correct value regarding probability of failure.
The algorithm is repeated until convergence satisfying the following criteria
If 1g(i k)e, stop (3.27)
where, e is a small quantity as 0.001, which is employed in this thesis. After
transformation by two-parameter equivalent transformation, the reliability index is
directly related to the probability of failure: pf described as
Pf =<D(-,8) (3.28)
where, (D(o) is the cumulative function of the standard normal variate.
3.3.2 Rail Reliability Analysis of the LEFM Approach
Rail defects directly relate to the serviceability of tracks so that the limit state of
serviceability exists on a state of crack growth. When the critical crack size, ac is
specified, a LSF for rails subjected to N stress cycle can be defined as
Z = g(X)= ac - a(N) (3.29)
where, a(N) is a crack size after a rail is subjected to N stress cycle. A crack size
corresponding to the number of stress cycles can be obtained by the Paris and Erdogan's
kinetic crack growth law as discussed earlier. Once a(N) exceeds the critical crack size,
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rail can be considered as failure.
Since the function T(*) defined by equation (3.16) is monotonically increasing
with the crack size a, the LSE represented in equation (3.29) can be expressed as
T(aC, ao)-W(aNao)=0 (3.30)
using equation (3.17), the above LSF can be rewritten as
(a, a) )- C-Sm(N - NO) = 0 (3.31)
where, ao is the initial crack size, and No is the crack initiation period.
The initial crack size is the crack size from which the fatigue crack will
propagate. It is a lower limit for the crack size which can be a fabrication crack. The large
variability in a fatigue analysis can be attributed to the uncertainty in the initial crack size,
which is usually random variable.
Although many types of the PDF of initial crack size in modeling the uncertainty
are suggested, in this study, it is modeled to a lognormal distribution with the mean of 0.2
[mm] and the correlation of variance (COV) of 0.3. The crack initiation period, No is
another aspect of crack initiation. It seems that no reasonable theory exists for the period,
some models are proposed. For simplicity, however, it is assumed that No is equal to
zero in this thesis. Through the methods mentioned in the section 3.2 and 3.3.1, the
reliability index of rail is evaluated.
The critical crack size ac is a significant parameter in the LEFM formulation.
It can be defined as the crack size causing failure of rail or the design crack size beyond
which the serviceability requirements cannot be satisfied. Since the fracture toughness is
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38 [MPa M 5 ] in general rail materials in JR East, the kinetic crack growth law shown in
equation (3.12) describes the critical crack size as
a = - (3.32)
ir 1. 12or-
where, ac is the critical far-field stress.
Rails generally have residual stress due to the manufacturing process.
Kashiwaya (2000) performs laboratory experiments to evaluate the internal residual stress
in detail by stress relaxing method with bar strain gage. As a result of the examination, it
turns out that large tensile residual stress exists at a rail base, which is around 100 [Mpa].
Because rails extend in summer and shrink in winter due to the effect of the temperature
variation, thermal stress should be also taken into account to evaluate the total stress. The
tensile stress of rails accompanied with decreasing temperature is at most 30 [Mpa] from
the theoretical solution (Sato 1997). Since the compression stress applied by trainloads is
no more than 10 [Mpa] as shown in Fig. 3.3, crack closing process by the compression
stress can be ignored. In consequence, the tensile stress is always applied to the rail base.
The critical crack size is 25 [mm] corresponding to the maximum stress, which can be
180 [MPa]. Fig. 3.5 shows the relationship between the far-field stress and the critical
crack size. The critical crack size has uncertainties due to the model, materials, and
environment so that the critical crack size is also random variables. It is assumed that the
critical crack size follows a lognormal distribution.
Based on the literature (Kashiwaya 2000), the means of C is 1.OE-11 and of
m is three in general rail materials in JR East. Table3.1 summarizes the parameters in
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this FORM analysis. Fig. 3.6 shows the relationship between the stress cycle and the
simulated reliability index.
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Fig. 3.5 Relationship between Critical Crack Size and Far-Field Stress
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Statistical Characteristics of Variables for FORM Analysis
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Tabale3.1
Variables Notation Type Mean Value COV
Critical Crack ac Lognormal 25 [mm] 0.1
Initial Crack
Size ao Lognormal 0.2 [mm] 0.3
Paramter m Constant 3.0 -
MamteralPaatera C Lognormal 1.OE- 11 0.3
3.3.3 Verification of Reliability Index
As alluded to the section 3.3.1, FORM performs the correct probability of failure,
when the LSE is linear. However, LSEs can be nonlinear in many cases due to the
nonlinear relationship among the random variables in the LSE, or due to some
non-Gaussian variables. The linear approximation of a nonlinear LSE is equivalent to
replacement of an n-dimensional failure surface with a hyper-plane tangent at the MPP as
shown in Fig. 3.7.
In other words, the curvature of the nonlinear LSE is ignored in the FORM
approach, which uses only a first-order approximation at the minimum distance point.
The FORM has errors when calculating the reliability index as long as the LSE does not
have linearity. However, the accuracy of the second-moment linear approximation is
generally difficult to assess, because this will depend on the degree of non-linearity of the
LSE. Therefore, a large sample MCS verifies the reliability index calculated in the
FORM analysis.
MCS approach consists of drawing samples of the variables according to their
PDF and then feeding them into a mathematical model of the LSF. The samples obtained
would give the probabilistic characteristics of the response of the random variable of the
LSF. It is known that if the value of the LSF is less than zero, it indicates failure. Let
Mf be the number of simulation cycles, when the LSE is less than zero. Let M be the
total number of simulation cycles. Therefore, an estimation of the probability of failure:
pj can be expressed as
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Pf = M (3.33)M
It is obvious that the estimation would converge to the true value as M
approaches infinity. Therefore, MCS includes errors as long as M is a limited number.
The way to evaluate the error associated with the number of simulation cycles is by
approximating the binomial distribution with a normal distribution and estimating a 95%
confidence interval of simulated probability of failure (Shooman 1968). It can be shown
that
P, 2 < p < 2 =0.95 (3.34)L-Mf~ M -FpMfp
where, pf is the true probability of failure. The percentage error can be defined as
1- p[%]= 'Pf x200 [%] (3.35)
M f- p
Table3.2 shows the results where sample size is equal to two millions, when load cycle
N is 10, 20, and 30million. They are 95% likely that the actual probability will be
within
N = lOMillion; 3.095<f < 3.122
N = 20 Million;1.052 <13<1.057 (3.36)
N = 30 Million;-0.153< 6/< -0.157
Fig. 3.8 shows the distinction the results between FORM and the MCS. As a matter of the
results, FORM is appropriate to evaluate the reliability index in this research.
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Fig. 3.7 Tangent Plane to g(X)= 0 at MPP
Table3.2 Results of Monte Carlo Simulation
Stress Cycle Mf Pf IF
10000000 1882 9.41E-4 4.608 %
20000000 291651 1.458E-1 0.342%
30000000 1123345 5.617E-1 0.125 %
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Fig. 3.8 Distinction of Results between FORM and the MCS
3.4 ET Analysis
3.4.1 Event Tree Model
An ET provides a systematic means of structuring relevant events related to an
uncertain environment. It represents the direct relationship and provides a clear and
precise definition among all possible events.
The ET is used as a model to represent all possible events associated with
inspection/repair actions, which are detection/repair, detection/no-repair, and no-detection
in this thesis. In order to make up an ET, a decision of above three options needs to be
made after every inspection. After every new inspection, past remedial actions affect new
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remedial actions. Hence, if no crack is detected or the crack size can be tolerated,
no-repair action would be taken. If repair work is assumed to be performed only when a
crack is detected and the crack size exceeds a critical repair level, a, the total number of
braches in an ET is 3 N, where N is the number of inspections during the service life.
Fig. 3.9 shows the basic component, which consists of chance nodes and folks,
of the ET. It represents the first mutually exclusive set of chance events. At the terminus
of each branch, track engineers form a new chance nodes and folks. Each probability in
these chance nodes is derived from the Probability of Detection (POD) and the
Probability of Repair (POR) discussed later.
Repair (B 1)
Detect
No-Repair (
No-Detect No-Repair
Fig. 3.9 Basic Component for ET
32)
(B3)
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The probability of the consequences, such as BI, B2, and B3 shown in Fig. 3.8,
can be calculated as follows:
P, (B1)= P1 = pdet repIdet
Pr (B2)= P = pdet -(prepIdet) (3.37)
P,.(B3)= P = (1 - Pde)- 1.-0
where, Pdet is the probability of detecting defects, Prepfdet is the probability of repairing
defects given a detection of defects. Since the consequences of both B2 and B3 are the
same actions, which is no-repair, Fig. 3.9 can be simplified as shown in Fig. 3.10. The
probabilities of repair and no-repair shown in Fig.3. 10 are defined as
Pr (repair)= pdet - Prepldet
Pr (no - repair) = Pdet -(1 - PrepIdet )+ (1 - Pdet )
For instance, assume that two inspections will be done during the service life.
Fig. 3.11 shows its ET. Let R+ indicate that a repair is done at timetI, and let R-
exhibits that a repair is not done at time tI. Similarly, an action must be taken again
whether or not to repair the structure. R' displays repair and R- indicates no-repair in
the second action. Let Pj be the probability of taking bi branch. Hence,
P r, =,(R+*
Pb2 =P (R;
P = P,.(R+* nR+}1( 2 (3.39)
P 4  Pr(R+ fR 2 )
P 5 =P ,(R~ R:)
Po =Pr(R- fR2
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The reliability of the structure must be evaluated at time t1, t 2 and calculate the reliability
index of the structure after corresponding to the inspections.
In addition, the weighted effect of each repair of branch must be considered.
Above procedures can be generalized into n times inspections. For each branch, b, the
reliability index of a rail at a time point given where b, is taken, is multiplied by the
probability of the branch, Pb,. The expected reliability index is equal to the sum of overall
branches and defined as
[n/ (
E[$6(N)] = -0D-1 CD (- $(N)) -P, (3.40)
here, <D-1(*) is the inverse function of a cumulative standard normal variate, n is the
number of lifetime inspections.
Pr (repair) Repair
Pr (no-repair) No-Repair
Fig. 3.10 Simplified Basic Component for ET
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Fig. 3.11 ET for Two Inspections during the Service Life
3.4.2 Uncertainty of Detection
NDT plays an essential role in a condition assessment in-service and repair
decision-making process. However, no inspection is perfect. NDT outputs depend on
many uncertain factors, such as conditions of structures, environmental conditions during
inspection, and operator skills.
Neglecting these uncertainties not only results in misinformed decision-making
but also leads to unnecessary remedial actions. A rational approach to evaluate the role of
these sources of uncertainties is a probabilistic method. Hence, evaluation of capability of
NDT expressed in terms of probability is essential to the ET analysis.
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The capability of an inspection technique can be defined in terms of two criteria,
detectability and accuracy. The ability of detecting cracks, termed detectability, depends
on sizes of cracks and the resolution to the capability of a particular NDT technique
adopted. It is known that there is always a critical crack size for a given NDT technique
below which a crack cannot be detected. As for accuracy, errors in defects refer to
measurement noises with respect to true sizes when defects are detected. The relationship
between the actual and measured crack size also depends on types of cracks and attributes
of a given NDT technique. The capability of NDT is termed POD in this thesis.
A POD is generally expressed in terms of Cumulative Density Function (CDF).
It is expected that as a crack size increases, its detectability also increases. It is assumed
that detectability can be described as the mean of CDF and accuracy can be expressed as
the COV of CDF in the model.
Zheng and Ellingwood (1998) propose the POD can be modeled to an
exponential distribution. Zhao and Haldar (1994) presume that the POD of a crack in
metal materials follows a lognormal distribution. In this thesis, the ET analysis is
performed on the assumption that POD is lognormally distributed with the mean of 0.5
[mm] and the COV of 0.05 shown in Fig. 3.12.
For any inspection, if the actual crack size at the time of inspection is smaller
than a detectable crack size when given NDT technique, the defect is not expected to be
detected. The event which no crack is detected during the inspection, when the rail has
been subjected to N stress cycle, can be expressed as
ad ! a(N) (3.41)
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where, ad is the capability at the time of inspection, a(N) is the estimated crack size
at N stress cycle. The LSF of the event as no-detection during inspection can be
defined as
h(X )=W(ad -ao)- (aN -a0 )
=W(ad -- a0)-CS N
(3.42)
where, P(e) is a fatigue-damage function, S M is the mean-stress range effect defined
in the section 3.1.4, N is a number of stress cycle to the corresponding to the time of
inspection. pdet can be obtained from solving this LSF based on the FORM,.
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Fig. 3.12 Capability of Inspection
3.4.3 Uncertainty of Repair
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Generally speaking, railroad companies have two options to repair damaged rails,
when they detect rail defects in a conventional joint rail track. One is to replace the
damaged rail; the other is to apply a joint bar. In this thesis, it is assumed that railroad
companies have an only option of replacement for simplicity of the analysis. In other
words, either decision of replacement or non-replacement will be made after every
inspection as long as defects are detected.
JR East defines the codes for rail remedial action shown in Tablel.1. This
management policy gives two opportunities regarding replacement for the track engineers.
One is planning replacement policy and the other is immediate replacement policy
corresponding to the critical repair level. The decision about these options can be
interpreted in a probabilistic form, Probability of Repair (POR) that implies track
engineers' actual response after inspections. It is assumed that the critical repair level, a,
follows a uniform distribution, where the maximum value of the PDF is the code size on
which track engineers must replace the damaged rail and the minimum value of the PDF
is the size on which the engineers will take some management actions. Fig. 3.13 shows
the CDF of ar. An associated LSF, i(X) similar to the one employed for reliability
analysis described earlier, can be defined as
i(X)= ar - a(N) (3.43)
where, a, is the critical repair level, a(N) is the estimated crack size at N stress
cycle. The prpidet can be obtained by using FORM with respect to the above LSF.
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3.4.4 Numerical Results
Fig. 3.14 shows the relationship between stress cycles and the expected
reliability index based on uniform interval inspection strategy during the service life, 360
Million Gross Ton (MGT) when one inspection case. It is certain that the one
inspection/repair intervention improves the reliability. Fig. 3.15, Fig. 3.16, Fig. 3.17, Fig.
3.18, and Fig. 3.19 show the relationship between stress cycles and the expected
reliability index, when two, three, four, and five uniformly interval inspections during the
service life, respectively.
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3Fig. 3.14 Case of One Inspection
Fig. 3.15 Case of Two Inspections
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3.5 LCC Analysis
3.5.1 LCC Model
An LCC analysis provides an economical evaluation of all current and future
costs associated with investment alternatives. It is a valuable economic analytical
technique for evaluating projects which require long-term capital and maintenance
expenditure over the analytical period of infrastructures, such as bridges, dams, and
railroads.
It is important to note that the same service life of each alternative must be used
to yield valid results when implementing the LCC analysis. DOT (2002) refers to this
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analytical service life, called analysis period as follows:
"LCC analysis uses a common period of time to assess cost difference between
alternatives so that the results can be fairly compared. This time period is termed the
analysis period. Allowing analysis period to vary among alternatives would result in the
comparison of alternatives with different total cost, which is not appropriate under LCC
analysis."
JR East sets up rules stipulating that the life of rails is 400 MGT (40 million
stress cycles) based on Miner's law and engineering judgement. Additionally, many rails
are replaced before reaching the critical number of load cycle because of the damage.
Therefore, 360 MGT, a 90% of the value, is employed as the analysis period.
LCC analysis enables comparison of the costs of alternatives regarding
inspection interval. The idea behind the LCC analysis is that decision related to
inspection/repair intervention should consider all the costs imposed to the railroad
companies incurred during the period over which the alternatives being compared. The
costs regarding rail maintenance should consist of inspection and repair costs as well as
costs due to the risk of a rail broken accident. Using an economic technique known as
discounting, these costs are converted into the present value in the LCC analysis.
Inspection costs are those involved in regular inspection of rails. For a strategy
involving n lifetime inspections, the total inspection cost, CINS is expressed as
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CIS __ n ins t(3.44)
7 (1+r)
where, Cins is each inspection cost based on the inspection technique, t is a time of
inspection at i, and r is the discount rate.
Repair costs are those for the main structural work and include all the costs of
structural assessment usually associated with repair decision-making. Rail repair costs,
Crep can be divided into
,,=C,, +C,, (3.45)
Crep = repa + repr (.5
where, Crepa is the structural assessment costs including all the costs, such as contract
cost with repair firms and re-investigation costs to identify the precise location, and Crepr
is the structural repair costs include all the costs of the labor, material, equipment,
administration to ensure safety under construction, and quality control. The ET is used to
investigate all possible events related to repair or no-repair actions. It is recognized that a
decision to either repair or no-repair needs to be made after every inspection to establish
the ET. A repair decision made after every new inspection is influenced by decisions
made in the past decision. Therefore, total repair cost should be expressed as a
probabilistic expected value. The costs of repair associated with each branch, b are:
C,, = n rep (3.46)
= (1 + r)J
where, Crepb is the costs of repair associated with the branch, bi and tj is the time of
repair. Therefore, the total expected repair cost, CREP is expressed as
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2"
CREP = Ce,bi Pi (3.47)
where, Pb, is the probability of taken branch, b .
Failure cost, derived from the risk of rail broken accident, includes all the costs
resulting from a broken rail. The total failure cost is defined as a product of the cost
regarding failure and lifetime probability of failure calculated by FORM. The lifetime
probability of failure is defined as
Pf,lf,bi = max(pf  b.
2n (3.48)
Pf,,ife = Pf ife,b - Pb
where, Pf,life,bi is the probability of failure at branch, bi pf,lif is the lifetime
probability of failure, and n is the number of inspection during the service life.
Therefore, the total expected failure cost is expressed as
C FAIL = Cf Pf,li (3.49)
where, CFAIL is the total expected repair cost and Cf is failure cost.
The LCC is formulated by summating all the expected costs and expressed as
LCC = CINS + REP + FAIL (3.50)
It is assumed that costs associated with failure, Cf are time-invariant to
simplify the analysis. Allowances are not made for the derailment due to a broken rail,
since the track safety system is remarkably redundant. The track signal system makes use
of rails. If a rail break, the signal always changes to red, which means no train can get
into the broken area. Even though a rail breaks just under a train, it turns out that the train
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is able to pass safely as long as the gap due to the break is up to 70 [mm] from the
in-depth experiment. Therefore, the probability of derailment is extremely small and
negligible.
3.5.2 Parameters of LCC Analysis in Defect Management
A parametric study is carried out in order to investigate relative influences of
main parameters on the total costs. For each parameter, a nominal value is selected.
Table3.3 summarizes nominal values applied to the study. As alluded to the previous
section, failure cost does not include derailment cost. It can be defined as the sum of
repair cost and delay cost which indicates railroad companies pay back to passengers as a
penalty based on covenant, if a train delays.
JR East pays back to passengers only when a train arrives late for the original
timetable more than two hours at the destination. If a rail break, it is hard to replace it
within two hours, so the repay cost can be failure cost in this study.
Table3.3 Nominal value of the Parameters in LCC Analysis
Cost Notation Nominal Value
Inspection Cost Cn, 1
Structural Assessment Cost Crepa 12.5
Structural Repair Cost Crepr 37.5
Failure Cost Cf 150
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3.6 Summary
This chapter describes a methodology for optimization of rail inspection,
reflecting the unique characteristics of rail defects such as trainload, crack growth rate,
and the uncertainty of remedial actions. The following is a summary of the results
obtained from the four analytical methods of LEFM, FORM, ET, and LCC.
" It turns out that the stress amplitude in rail bases is 50 [MPa] when train speed is
100 [km/h], wheel load is 10 [t], and 50N type rail, a conventional rail type in JR
East. To simulate the stress amplitude, a continuously supported elastic model and
a superposition method are employed.
" The stress that occurs at rail bases applied by trainload can be expressed by linear
summation of static and dynamic stress. If both static and dynamic follow the
stationary Gaussian random process, the stress amplitude follows Rayleigh
distribution. Hence, the stress by trainload requires a probabilistic model.
" The rail resistance against trainload is considered as time-variant due to
deterioration process. Rail base crack growth is recognized as a common cause of
the deterioration. The prediction of crack growth in rail base at arbitrary times is
evaluated by the semi-elliptical crack model based on Paris and Erdogan's law.
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" FORM, a probabilistic method, is an adequate tool for assessing the structural
safety and serviceability in order to take into account uncertainties associated with
the prediction of crack growth, i.e., initial crack size and material parameters, as
well as associated with the evaluation of reliability, i.e., critical crack size.
" FORM, one of the probabilistic approaches using first-order second moment
approximation, is applicable for time-varying rail reliability because the results of
FORM are always within 95% confidence interval, comparing the results by the
Monte Carlo simulation with two million simulation samples.
" The ET can represent systematically all possible actions with respect to rail
management, detection of defects, no-detection of defects, repair of the defects,
and no-repair of the defects.
* The ET analysis is conducted considering both the uncertainty of NDT due to its
imperfection, and remedial actions resulting from the decision-making process by
solving other FORM regarding detecting defects and repairing defects.
" The LCC analysis model for rail management is formulated by summation of
expected inspection cost, expected repair cost, and expected failure cost, taking
into consideration the time value of money.
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Chapter 4
Application and Results
4.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to postulate the optimal number of rail inspections
in the first grade track of JR East, where more than two million trainload cycles a year
occur by minimizing the expected total cost, the LCC including the expected inspection
cost, the expected repair cost, and the expected failure cost.
In addition, this chapter presents the three results of sensitivity analysis. Since
NDT is not perfect, as mentioned earlier, it is worthwhile to analyze the effect of other
NDT techniques on the optimal number of rail inspections. Moreover, it is interesting
how the optimal number of rail inspections changes when JR East alters the remedial
action codes because the maintenance cost is related to frequency of inspection.
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Furthermore, since it is arduous for railroad companies to evaluate accurate failure cost, it
is advantageous to do sensitivity analysis for failure cost in LCC analysis.
4.2 Optimization of the Number of Inspections
4.2.1 Estimation of the LCC
As formulated in the previous chapter, the ET analysis can provide systematically
all possible events regarding rail management. However, since the number of branches in
the ET exponentially increases as the number of rail inspections increases, it is laborious
to analyze the ET when the number of rail inspections is more than six or seven. For
instance, when the number of rail inspections is 10, the number of branches in an ET
becomes 310=59,049 and an ET has 3"= 14,348,907 branches corresponding to 15
inspections. Therefore, some approximation methods are needed in order to assess the
each expected cost instead of the ET analysis. Two million trainload cycles a year are
employed in the analysis to compare with the actual JR East inspection codes. Discount
rate is assumed to be 2%.
Fig. 4.1 shows the relationship between the expected inspection cost and the
number of inspections. A linear relation is so conceivable that the linear trend line
calculated by the least squares estimation method accordingly represents the relation as
follows:
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CINS =O.8406n .0044 (4.1)
where, n is the number of inspections. Since the coefficient of determination, R is 1.0,
the linear equation is perfectly exact to represent the relation. Fig. 4.2 depicts the
relationship between the expected repair cost and the number of inspections. The
expected cost gradually increases when the number of inspections increases so that a
logarithm curve may be appropriate for the expression. The curve is obtained by the least
squares estimation method as follows:
CREP =17.105In n +11.238 (4.2)
R of this approximation is 0.998. It is general that the forecasting line is pertinent when
the coefficient of determination is greater than 0.95. The logarithm curve is suitable for
the arrangement. Fig. 4.3 exhibits the relationship between the expected failure cost and
the number of inspections. Conceivably, the relation follows exponential estimation. The
least squares estimator is similarly the best line to represent the relation as follows:
CFAIL =97.583exp[-0.1357n] (4.3)
R is 0.992 in this approximation.
As a result, the LCC is formulated by the following equation, which is a function
of the inspection number.
LCC = 0.8406n-0.0044+17.1051nn+11.238+97.583exp[-1.357n]
= 0.846n +17.1051n n+97.583exp[-1.357n]+11.2336
(4.4)
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4.2.2 The Optimal Number of Rail Inspections
Table4.1 and Fig. 4.4 show the results of the analysis for the different number of
rail inspections in the LCC, using the approximation method mentioned in the previous
section. It is interesting to note that the expected costs for inspection and repair increase
whereas the expected failure cost decreases, as the number of inspection increases. This
indicates that the increment of the inspection can improve the reliability of rails. In this
manner, there is a trade-off point at which the LCC is minimized. From Fig. 4.4, it is
found that an optimal number of rail inspections are 14 and the minimum LCC is 82.741,
in other word; rail inspection should be done every 2.57 million trainload cycles.
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Table4.1 Results of LCC Analysis
Number of CFAIL LCC
Inspection INS
1 0.836 11.238 85.200 97.274
2 1.677 23.094 74.389 99.160
3 2.517 30.030 64.949 97.496
4 3.358 34.951 56.707 95.016
5 4.199 38.767 49.511 92.477
6 5.039 41.886 43.229 90.154
7 5.880 44.523 37.743 88.146
8 6.720 46.807 32.954 86.481
9 7.561 48.822 28.772 85.155
10 8.402 50.624 25.121 84.146
11 9.242 52.254 21.933 83.429
12 10.083 53.742 19.150 82.975
13 10.923 55.111 16.720 82.755
14 11.764 56.379 14.598 82.741
15 12.605 57.559 12.746 82.910
16 13.445 58.663 11.128 83.237
17 14.286 59.700 9.716 83.702
18 15.126 60.678 8.483 84.288
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Fig. 4.4 Results of LCC Analysis
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4.2.3 Discussions
The following lists results and suggestions obtained from the LCC analysis with
new estimation model with respect to the expected costs.
" It turns out that a statistical approximation method can express the relationship
between the expected cost and the number of inspections regarding rail defect
management, avoiding the laborious calculation of the ET analysis.
" As mentioned earlier, JR East requires the track engineers to inspect rails every
two million wheel load cycles. As there are about two million wheel load cycles a
year in the first grade tracks, the engineers have to test the rails by NDT once a
year. It is possible to extend this inspection interval from 20.OMGT into 25.7MGT
on the basis of the results of this research. However, other defects including rail
head and bolt-hole cracks should be considered for the final decision about
inspection interval extension.
4.3 Sensitivity Analysis
4.3.1 The Effect of NDT Techniques
There are several types of NDT techniques, such as sliding and rolling probes in
the ultrasonic inspection technique. Generally speaking, the more expensive NDT
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technique is, the more capable the technique is. Hence, the types of NDT techniques have
a significant effect on the optimal number of rail inspections. Three different inspection
devices are used to illustrate the effect in the study. The detectability, accuracy, and cost
associated with each NDT technique are shown in Table4.2 and Fig. 4.5. All the PODs
are assumed to follow lognormal distribution. It is clear that type A is most detactable and
accurate among them while type C is the least one.
In addition to the above sensitivity analysis, the simulation of LCC is conducted
for the effect of both detecability and accuracy of NDT. Table4.3, Fig.4.6, and Fig4.7
show the cases for the simulation. All the costs of NDT are identical for the comparison.
ci's =1.0 and C,, =0.5 are used for the simulation. Although NDT of case D, E, and F
have the same accuracy, they have different detectability. On the other hand, NDT of case
D, G, and H have the same detectability and different accuracy.
Table 4.2 Condition of Sensitivity Analysis for POD
Technique Type Detectability Accuracy Cost
A lognormal 0.5 0.05 1
B lognormal 1.0 0.05 0.5
C lognormal 2.0 0.2 0.25
Table4.3 Condition of Sensitivity Analysis for Detectability and Accuracy
Case Type Detectability Accuracy
D lognormal 1.0 0.05
E lognormal 2.0 0.05
F lognormal 3.0 0.05
G lognormal 1.0 0.25
H lognormal 1.0 0.5
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Fig. 4.8 shows the expected reliability index in NDT technique type A, B, and C, when
the number of rail inspection is five. As expected, the more detective and accurate
inspection device is, the more the expected reliability index is improved. Fig. 4.9 shows
the relationship between the expected repair cost and the number of inspection in NDT
technique type B and C (Type A is already investigated in the section 4.2). The
approximation line is obtained from this results as follows
CREP(B) =18.01In n +6.6014 (4.5)
CREP(C) =17.1561n n + 3.8099 (4.6)
R of equation (4.5) and (4.6) is 0.999. Fig. 4.10 depicts the relationship between the
expected failure cost and the number of inspections. Similarly above, the least squares
estimator is:
CFAIL(B) =105.97 exp[-0.098n] (4.7)
CFAIL(C) 110.09exp[- 0.1186n] (4.8)
R of equation (4.7) and (4.8) is 0.981. Tabale4.4 and Table4.5 corresponding to Fig. 4.11
and Fig. 4.12 show the results of LCC analysis for NDT technique type B and C
respectively based on the above approximation method.
It can be seen that the LCC decreases when the inspection cost is half of the
original one, even though the detectability of NDT deteriorates from 0.5 [mm] into 1.0
[mm]. Similar conclusion can be drawn from Tabale4.5. The LCC with respect to the low
capable NDT is smaller than that of high performance NDT, if the cost is one-fourth
original one.
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Table4.4 Results of LCC Analysis in Type B NDT
Number of CINS C C LCCInspection CSC FAlL
1 0.418 6.601 94.119 101.138
2 0.838 19.085 83.593 103.516
3 1.258 26.387 74.244 101.890
4 1.679 31.569 65.941 99.188
5 2.099 35.587 58.566 96.252
6 2.519 38.871 52.016 93.407
7 2.940 41.647 46.199 90.786
8 3.360 44.052 41.032 88.444
9 3.780 46.173 36.443 86.397
10 4.201 48.071 32.368 84.639
11 4.621 49.787 28.748 83.156
12 5.041 51.355 25.533 81.928
13 5.461 52.796 22.677 80.935
14 5.882 54.131 20.141 80.153
15 6.302 55.373 17.888 79.564
16 6.722 56.536 15.888 79.146
17 7.143 57.628 14.111 78.881
18 7.563 58.657 12.533 78.753
19 7.983 59.631 11.131 78.745
20 8.404 60.555 9.886 78.844
21 8.824 61.433 8.781 79.038
22 9.244 62.271 7.799 79.314
23 9.664 63.072 6.927 79.663
24 10.085 63.838 6.152 80.075
25 10.505 64.573 5.464 80.542
26 10.925 65.280 4.853 81.058
27 11.346 65.959 4.310 81.615
28 11.766 66.614 3.828 82.208
29 12.186 67.246 3.400 82.833
30 12.607 67.857 3.020 83.483
31 13.027 68.448 2.682 84.156
32 13.447 69.019 2.382 84.848
33 13.867 69.574 2.116 85.557
34 14.288 70.111 1.879 86.278
35 14.708 70.633 1.669 87.010
36 15.128 71.141 1.482 87.751
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Table4.4 Results of LCC Analysis in Type C NDT
Number of
Inspection CINS CREP FAIL LCC
1 0.084 3.810 99.813 103.707
2 0.168 15.702 90.495 106.365
3 0.252 22.658 82.047 104.957
4 0.336 27.593 74.388 102.317
5 0.420 31.421 67.444 99.285
6 0.504 34.549 61.148 96.201
7 0.588 37.194 55.440 93.222
8 0.672 39.485 50.264 90.421
9 0.756 41.505 45.572 87.834
10 0.840 43.313 41.318 85.471
11 0.924 44.948 37.461 83.333
12 1.008 46.441 33.964 81.413
13 1.092 47.814 30.793 79.700
14 1.176 49.086 27.919 78.180
15 1.260 50.269 25.312 76.842
16 1.344 51.376 22.950 75.670
17 1.428 52.417 20.807 74.652
18 1.512 53.397 18.865 73.774
19 1.596 54.325 17.104 73.024
20 1.680 55.205 15.507 72.392
21 1.764 56.042 14.059 71.865
22 1.848 56.840 12.747 71.435
23 1.932 57.602 11.557 71.092
24 2.016 58.333 10.478 70.827
25 2.100 59.033 9.500 70.633
26 2.184 59.706 8.613 70.503
27 2.268 60.353 7.809 70.430
28 2.352 60.977 7.080 70.409
29 2.436 61.579 6.419 70.434
30 2.520 62.161 5.820 70.501
31 2.604 62.723 5.277 70.604
32 2.688 63.268 4.784 70.740
33 2.772 63.796 4.338 70.905
34 2.856 64.308 3.933 71.097
35 2.940 64.805 3.565 71.311
36 3.024 65.289 3.233 71.545
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Fig. 4.13 shows the relationship between the LCC and the different detectable NDT
techniques. Fig. 4.14 displays the relationship between the LCC and the different accurate
NDT techniques. It can be seen that the LCC is not sensitive to accuracy of NDT but
sensitive to their detectability. If the low performance NDT is developed at half a cost of
original one, the LCC is the same as medium performance NDT.
4.3.2 The Effect of Repair Regulation
This study considers three POR approaches, which indicate that JR East tightens
remedial action codes and loosens the codes. JR East spends 30% of the operational cost
for the maintenance, as alluded to chapter 1. It is beneficial to analyze the effect of
changing the remedial action codes on the optimal number of rail inspections, because
modification of remedial action codes may reduce the total maintenance cost. Fig. 4.15
shows the three PORs when ar is 1.5 [mm], 2.0 [mm], and 2.5 [mm], respectively. As
summarized in Tabale 1.1, JR East requires the track engineers to repair immediately rails
when they find more than 3.0 [mm] cracks in the rails. Since the POR is modeled to
describe this policy in this thesis, the change of ar from 2.0 [mm] into 1.5 [mm]
indicates that the track engineers must take immediately a remedial action if they detect a
crack of the more than 2.0 [mm]. Similarly, when ar is 2.5 [mm], the engineers have to
repair immediately the rail that has a crack of more than 4.0 [mm]. All PORs are assumed
to be uniformly distributed. Table4.6 summarizes the condition of this sensitivity
analysis.
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Fig. 4.16 displays the expected reliability index in five inspections during the
service life. As expected, the expected reliability index is smaller than that of the original
code, when the remedial action code is loosen. Fig. 4.17 shows the relationship between
the expected repair cost and the number of inspections in type a and c (Type b is already
analyzed in the section 4.2). As a result, the approximation line is obtained from the
outputs as follows:
CREP(a) =16.6841n n +13.95 (4.9)
R in type a is 0.996 and R
the expected failure cost and
CREP(c) =17.281n n +9.5141 (4.10)
in type c is 0.999. Fig. 4.18 shows the relationship between
the number of inspections. Similarly the trend lines are:
CFAIL(a) = 92.598 exp[- 0. 148n] (4.11)
CFAIL(C) = 100.72 exp[- 0.1284n] (4.12)
R in type a is 0.992 and R in type c is 0.991. Table4.7 and 4.8 corresponding to Fig.
4.19 and Fig. 4.20 show the results for different numbers of inspections in the LCC
analysis when a, is 1.5 [mm] and 2.5 [mm], respectively.
Table 4.6 Condition of Sensitivity Analysis for POR
Case Type ar Definition
a uniform 1.5 If crack size is more than 2 [mm], the rail mustbe replaced immediately
b uniform 2.0 If crack size is more than 3 [mm], the rail mustbe replaced immediately
c uniform 2.5 If crack size is more than 4 [mm], the rail mustbe replaced immediately
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Inspections in Sensitivity Analysis for Remedial Actions
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Table4.7 Results of LCC Analysis in ar=1.5 [mm]
Number of CINS C C LCCInspection CREP FAI L
1 0.836 13.950 79.851 94.638
2 1.677 25.514 68.859 96.051
3 2.517 32.279 59.381 94.177
4 3.358 37.079 51.207 91.643
5 4.199 40.802 44.158 89.158
6 5.039 43.844 38.079 86.962
7 5.880 46.416 32.837 85.133
8 6.720 48.643 28.317 83.681
9 7.561 50.608 24.419 82.589
10 8.402 52.366 21.058 81.826
11 9.242 53.956 18.159 81.358
12 10.083 55.408 15.659 81.150
13 10.923 56.744 13.504 81.171
14 11.764 57.980 11.645 81.389
15 12.605 59.131 10.042 81.778
16 13.445 60.208 8.660 82.313
17 14.286 61.219 7.468 82.973
18 15.126 62.173 6.440 83.739
120.0
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Fig. 4.19 Table4.6 Results of LCC Analysis in ar=1.5 [mm]
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Table4.8 Results of LCC Analysis in ar=2.5 [mm]
Number of C E FAIL LCC
Inspection INS CREP
1 0.836 9.514 88.583 98.934
2 1.677 21.492 77.909 101.078
3 2.517 28.498 68.521 99.537
4 3.358 33.469 60.265 97.092
5 4.199 37.325 53.003 94.527
6 5.039 40.476 46.616 92.131
7 5.880 43.139 40.999 90.018
8 6.720 45.447 36.059 88.226
9 7.561 47.482 31.714 86.757
10 8.402 49.303 27.892 85.596
11 9.242 50.950 24.531 84.723
12 10.083 52.453 21.575 84.111
13 10.923 53.836 18.975 83.735
14 11.764 55.117 16.689 83.570
15 12.605 56.309 14.678 83.592
16 13.445 57.424 12.909 83.779
17 14.286 58.472 11.354 84.112
18 15.126 59.460 9.986 84.572
120.0
100.0-_ _
80.0 
-+-CINS
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... - - - C FA IL
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Fig. 4.20 Result of LCC Analysis in ar=2.5 [mm]
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It can be seen that the LCC is smaller than that of original code when a proactive
maintenance policy is employed, which implies a tightened repair codes.
4.3.3 The Effect of Failure Cost
A LCC analysis is the one of the comprehensive economic means of comparing
project investments and maintenance expenditures. The LCC analysis has applications in
many interest areas for government and private infrastructure sectors, such as highways,
ports, and railroads.
However, the LCC analysis has several controversial problems when providing
outputs. The most significant of them is cost uncertainty. When data are collected to
support the LCC analysis, there may be uncertainties in economic values of inputs and
outputs. In particular, failure cost may represent the greatest challenging to the LCC
analysis implementation, since the estimation is very intricate. Although the failure cost is
assumed to be an invariant repay cost to passengers in this thesis, it fundamentally
depends on the ride rate of each train. Failure cost can be random variables. Therefore,
sensitivity analysis for failure cost is important for the decision process of rail defect
management, instead of regarding the failure cost as random variables.
Fig. 4.21 shows the relationship between the failure cost and the optimal number
of rail inspections, when failure cost varies from 150 to 500 in nominal values. Fig. 4.22
also shows the same relationship when using the optimal inspection interval instead of
the optimal number of inspections.
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4.3.4 Discussions
For the purpose of evaluating the effect of parameters on the LCC analysis and
the optimal number of inspections, sensitivity analysis is conducted. The important
results and suggestions through sensitivity analysis are summarized in the following:
" It turns out that the detectability of NDT has greater influence on the LCC than
the accuracy of NDT has on the LCC. This indicates that JR East should attempt
to develop NDT devices with increasing high detectability, even if they have a
few errors.
" Even if the remedial action policy is modified with an increase of LCC, the
optimal number of inspection would be identical to that of original policy.
However, a proactive maintenance policy, which implies a tightened repair code,
can reduce both the LCC and the optimal number of inspections.
" The optimal number of inspections and the LCC are highly dependant on the
failure costs. For instance, it can be seen that the optimal number of inspections
increases by 1.7 times if the failure cost is three times the original cost. Therefore,
decision-makers should make a judgement about the failure costs on the basis of
calibrations when evaluating the optimal number of inspections.
103
The application of the presented model to the process of optimization of
inspection/repair intervention represents a significant advance in the decision-making
process with regard to rail defect management. Instead of basing decisions about
inspection intervals on empirical judgement, the model presents a quantitative method for
making these decisions, taking into consideration on uncertainties with respect to rail
defects management. All results of sensitivity analysis are summarized in Table4.9.
Table4.9 Overall Summary of Sensitivity Analysis
POD POR Cost Optimal
Detectability Accuracy a Inspection LCC
(COV) ar Cins Crep Cfail Interval(COV)____ _ _ _ " " " [Million]
0.5 0.05 2.0 1.0 50 150 2.57 82.742
1.0 0.05 2.0 0.5 50 150 1.89 78.745
2.0 0.2 2.0 0.25 50 150 1.29 70.409
1.0 0.05 2.0 1.0 50 150 2.40 85.866
2.0 0.05 2.0 1.0 50 150 2.00 87.410
3.0 0.05 2.0 1.0 50 150 1.80 97.495
1.0 0.25 2.0 1.0 50 150 2.25 83.348
1.0 0.5 2.0 1.0 50 150 2.40 84.962
0.5 0.05 1.5 1.0 50 150 3.00 81.150
0.5 0.05 2.5 1.0 50 150 2.57 83.570
0.5 0.05 2.0 1.0 50 200 2.12 86.941
0.5 0.05 2.0 1.0 50 250 1.89 89.914
0.5 0.05 2.0 1.0 50 300 1.80 92.222
0.5 0.05 2.0 1.0 50 350 1.64 94.102
0.5 0.05 2.0 1.0 50 400 1.57 95.678
0.5 0.05 2.0 1.0 50 450 1.50 97.043
0.5 0.05 2.0 1.0 50 500 1.44 98.245
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4.4 Summary
This chapter gives details of applications and results based on the methodology
and outputs of the previous chapter. First of all, the optimal inspection interval is
postulated. It is determined that the extension of inspection interval is possible. Next, the
sensitivity of the optimal inspection interval for different NDT techniques is investigated.
Results indicate that though the accuracy of NDT does not affect the LCC, the
detectability of NDT is significant for the LCC. Moreover, the investigation of repair
regulation indicates a proactive maintenance policy may reduce the LCC. Finally, some
suggestions obtained from the applications are discussed.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
5.1 Summary
This thesis discusses some applications of the modeling work to rail defect
management. In particular, two main applications are described as follows:
" Determination of the optimal inspection interval on the basis of the quantitative
approach.
* Measurement of the effect of inspection equipment and of remedial actions on the
optimal inspection interval and the LCC.
The frequency of rail inspections tends to vary from one railroad to another, yet it is
usually based on either time or traffic tonnage. Railroad companies have evolved their
rail inspection schedules empirically, based on long field experience. Rail defect
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management refers to the development and implementation of strategies to control the
risk of rail failure. The primary method to control the risk is a rail inspection through
nondestructive evaluation and is a replacement of rails based on the evaluation results.
To demonstrate the feasibility of the above applications, first, a Linear Elastic
Fracture Mechanics (LEFM) analysis which can predict a crack size in a rail base is
performed. Second, a First-Order Reliability Methods (FORM) analysis evaluates the
reliability of a rail, considering some uncertainties of parameters. Third, an Event Tree
(ET) analysis represents systematically all possible events and actions regarding rail
defect management. Finally, a Life-Cycle Cost (LCC) analysis formulates the total
expected cost during the service life are conducted.
5.2 Conclusions
The main conclusions obtained from the research are:
* At every 2.57 million trainload cycles, rail inspection should be done.
Since the present inspection interval is two million trainload cycles in JR East, it is
possible to extend the interval in order to reduce the total cost of rail defect management;
when inspection cost 1, repair cost 50, and failure cost 150 in nominal value, analysis
period 360MGT, wheel load 10 [t], train speed 100 [km/h], all uncertain parameters
follow lognormal distribution.
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* Detectability of NDT is the significant parameter in the process of
determining the optimal inspection interval.
It turns out that the detectability of NDT has more influences on the LCC than does the
accuracy of NDT. This indicates that JR East should attempt to develop devices of NDT
of high detectability, even if they must sacrifice some accuracy.
* A proactive maintenance policy reduces both the LCC and the number of
inspections.
In the present remedial action codes, JR East requires the track engineers to replace the
any rails that include base crack of more than 3 [mm]. The alternation from 3 [mm] into 2
[mm] reduces the LCC and extend the inspection interval. JR East should adopt a
proactive maintenance policy.
5.3 Recommendations for Future Work
This thesis demonstrates the feasibility of reliability-based optimization of rail
inspection. However, several issues need further development and refinement, before the
presented approach should be implemented into practice.
0 Combination with other types of defects
Other types of defects including rail head defects, web defects, and joint-hole defects,
should be considered when evaluating the reliability index. The structural reliability
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theory can be performed both at single failure mode and at multiple failure modes. When
implementing the analysis with respect to the multiple failure modes, rail defects are
modeled as a series.
* Numerical approach for calculating of the LCC
Each expected cost to evaluate the LCC is drawn from an analytical approach,
specifically an approximation method based on the least squares estimation. However, a
numerical approach, such as the Morkov Chain Monte Carlo Simulation should be
attempted to raise a precision of the evaluation of the expected reliability index.
9 Optimization for inspection intervals
Rail defects tend to grow slowly and steadily at first, then the growth rate increases
exponentially as the defects becomes larger. Therefore, non-uniform interval inspection
may reduce the risk. Associated with this fact, variable interval inspection policy may
also reduce the optimal number of inspections and the LCC.
e Updating crack size information
The LEFM analysis and the FORM analysis incorporate information of crack size with
the results of NDT. In addition to the approach, updating the data should be done. This is
because that whether any crack is detected or not, each inspection provides additional
information about the probability distribution of the crack size. Thus, mathematical
updating models, such as Bayesian approach, must be available to revise the information.
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Appendix A
Equivalent Normal Variables
A. 1 Rosenblatt Transformation
Hasofer-Lind reliability index can be exactly related to the failure probability, if
all the variables are statistically independent and normally distributed and the limit state
surface is linear. If not all the variables are normally distributed, as is common in
engineering problems, it is necessary to transform the non-normal variables into
equivalent normal variables.
In the section 3.2, probabilities involving non-normal distributions are calculated
using equivalent normal distributions. In effect, this involves the transformation of a
general set of correlated random variables into an equivalent set of independent Gaussian
variates. A general transformation for this purpose is the Rosenblatt transformation
(Rosenblatt 1952).
Suppose a set of n random variables X = (XI, X 2 ,..., X,, ) with a joint Cumulative
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Distribution Function (CDF) Fx (x). A set of statistically independent standard normal
variates, U = (Ul, U2,..., U,,) can be obtained from the following equations.
'1(u)= F(x 1)
(U2 = F2 (X2 JX10
(U3) =F3 (X3 JX1I X2 (A.1)
where, i(.) is the CDF of standard normal variates. Inverting the above equations
successively, the desired normal variates U are obtained as follows.
u1 = D-1[F(xi)]
U 2 = (~1 IF2 (X2 JX10
U3 
-- D~1(F3(X3 1 X2)] (A.2)
U, = D~1 IFx x,2-->n-
where, (D-1 (o) is the inverse function of the CDF of standard normal variates. The
equation (A.2) constitutes the Rosenblatt transformation.
The conditional CDFs in the equation (A.2) can be obtained from the joint PDFs
as follows.
Since
the required CDF can be obtained as
f (x, x 2 ,-...X 1) (A.3)
-Xi-.=F~xi1XII X - i- 
-f (XI X21 ..Xi-1)
(A.4)
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It is obvious that Rosenblatt transformation is available only when the joint CDF of all
random variables is available.
A.2 Two-Parameter Equivalent Transformation
Because a normal random variable can be described uniquely by two parameters,
any two conditions can be used for the transformation from non-normal variables into
normal variables. Rackwitz and Fiessler (1978) estimate the parameters of the equivalent
normal distribution, plx{ and X, by imposing two conditions. The CDFs and PDFs of
the actual variables and equivalent normal variables should be equal at the checking point
(xI, X,..., X3 ) on the failure surface. Considering each statistically independent non-
normal variable individually and equating its CDF with an equivalent normal variable at
the checking point result in
x N
Fx,(x= N x' (A.5)
where, Fx, (xi) is the CDF of the original non-normal variable, and pUN and N are the
mean and standard deviation of the equivalent normal variable at the checking point. The
equation (A.5) yields by Rosenblatt transformation
-N
Ni =U x (D-1[F x (x iUX (A.6)
.E. qN t X P ofN t o -1 nFx, (x
Equating the PDFs of the original non-normal variable and the equivalent normal variable
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at the checking point by differentiating the equation (A.5) results in
-N
f ( ) -' Xj(A .7 )
fxi (Xx) = 0 0
where, #(e) is the standard normal probability density function and fx, is the PDF of a
original non-normal variable. Equation (A.7) yields
N #{f(D-Fx,(x )]
= f(X)(A.8)
The mean value and the probability of excess of the equivalent normal variable are made
equal to the median value and the probability of excess of the original non-normal
variable, respectively, at the checking point. pa4 can be estimated as
N = F,(0.5) (A.9)
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Appendix B
Reliability Index
B .1 Hasofer-Lind Reliability Index
The simplest way to explain the Hasofer-Lind reliability index is to examine the
case of two independent random variables. Let R represent a random variable describing
the strength or resistance of a system and let S represent a random variable describing the
stress placed on the system. R and S are assumed to be statistically independent for
simplicity. System failure occurs when the stress on the system exceeds the strength of
the system: Q = {(r,s) R < S}. Fig. B.1 shows the concepts of a Limit State Equation
(LSE) and the associated failure/safe regions. The LSE can be expressed as follows:
G,(R,S)=R-S
R (B.1)G2(R, S)= R_1 (.1S
According to the concept by Cornell (1969), the reliability index is defined as the value
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where the mean value of the LSE is divided by the standard deviation of the LSE. Hence,
PG- (B.2)
AG
where, AG and OG are the mean value and standard deviation of the LSE, respectively.
Therefore, the reliability index of equation (B. 1) is:
_ AR AS
AR -1 (B.3)
_ As _ARAS (R )S
12 2 27,
UR AR XO2 PR US + 'S UR
r24AR A5
6 and 82 are not identical, despite of the fact that each of the reliability indexes should
give identical results. This indicates "the problem of invariance."
Hasofer and Lind (1974) suggest the method to overcome the problem of
invariance by defining the reliability index as the minimum distance from origin to the
LSE. They also introduce the reduced variates for normalization as follows:
R-R' = RP
UR (B.4)
S-
as
The new LSE is defined in terms of reduced variates as follows:
G,(R',S')=(PR + OR') -(s +os S')=0
.PR +UR I'=,Us +as S,
(B.5)
G 2 (R,S) R R -1=0As +Us
.R + URR = ,s + US S
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Graphically, the new LSE appears in Fig. B.2. Such a problem of invariance is
circumvented as long as the reliability index is calculated by the minimum distance from
origin to the new LSE in reduced coordinate, because each LSE of G1 and G2 is identical
as shown above. Equating the new LSE:
S' = R R'+ YR ~ US (B.6)
as as
Then the Hasofer-Lind reliability index is:
2 _,US )2 a2 _R S 22 R (PR + S &1R
2 2)22 T
= S2 (PR _,S )2 (B.7)
_ 
R S
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Fig. B.1 Limit State Equation in Two Random Variables
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Fig. B.2 New Limit State Equation
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B.2 Rackwitz-Fiessler Algorithm
As mentioned in the section B.1, it is necessary to search the minimum distance
from the origin to the failure surface in reduced coordinate in order to evaluate the
Hasofer-Lind reliability index. To solve the optimization problem expressed in the
equation (3.25) in the section 3.3.1, many algorithms are presented. Newton-Raphson
type recursive algorithm, also called Rackwitz-Fiessler algorithm (1978) is one of them.
The algorithm can be best explained with help of Fig.B.3 and B.4 in case of two
independent random variables. First, consider the linear LSE shown in Fig.B.3. Since the
limit sate is not available in a closed form, the starting point xO may not be on the
LSE g(x) =0, but on a parallel line g(x) = k . Hence, the optimization algorithm has to
start from point xO which may not be on the LSE and converge to the minimum distance
point x* on the LSE. The linear LSE can be expressed as
g(x)=b+a x (B.8)
where, a" Tis the transpose of the gradient vector of the LSE. The magnitude of the
vectorsx o , x* denote the distance from the origin to the starting point and the LSE,
respectively. Using geometry, x can be expressed in terms of xO as
F* = a xO -9 gx){a} (B.9)
Since the LSE is linear in this case, its gradient is constant. Hence, the distance to the
LSE from the origin can be obtained in one step.
Next, equation (B.9) can be generalized for a non-linear LSE as shown Fig. B.4 as
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!k+1 -2 k k ~~ AL k (B.10)|Vg(_xk j
where, Vg(L) is the gradient vector of the LSE at Xk, kth iteration point. Note that k
refers to the iteration number. Since the LSE is not linear, the gradient is not constant but
varies from one point to another point. Therefore, instead of one-step solution in case of
linear LSE, the point of the minimum distance has to be searched through recursive
formula given by equation (B.10). The LSE can be approximated by the tangent, first-
order approximation at each iteration point. The LSE is linearized with g(_X) and
Vg(L) corresponding to g(xo) and a, respectively in the equation (B.9). The next
iteration point is computed in the same way as in the case of the linear LSE. If the LSE is
linear, Ak,1 is identical to Xk . However, its value and the gradient at _Xk+1 are different
from those at _k .Therefore, it is again linearized at Xkj and another iteration point xk+2
is computed. This algorithm is repeated until convergence meeting requirements of
particular criteria.
In this First-Order Reliability Method (FORM) approach, the distance from the
origin to the failure surface in the reduced coordinate is calculated by using first-order
approximation at the each iteration point. When the LSE is not linear, the curvature of the
LSE is not considered. Second-Order Reliability Method (SORM) and First-Order Third
Moment (FOTM) (Zhao and Ang 2003) have been recently developed to improve
precision of evaluation of the reliability index instead of FORM.
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Fig. B.3 Searching Algorithm for a Linear LSE
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Fig. B.4 Searching Algorithm for a Non-Linear LSE
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